We label the amount reported in response to the first question as "religious gifting," the sum of the responses to the final four questions as "secular gifting," and the sum of all responses as "total gifting."
THE U-SHAPED GIVING PROFILE Table 1 provides the details for each of our income increments. We examine income-giving segments in $10,000 increments from less than $10,000 to $100,000. To address issues of micronumerosity, we condense the upper income categories into the $100,000 to $149,999 level and the $150,000 and more level. This compression also helps to avoid distortion from topcoding where, to preserve participant privacy, each income component observation that falls outside certain very high critical values is replaced with a topcoded value that represents the mean of the subset of all such outlying observations (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2005) . Average giving levels reflect average gifts among all households in the category including nongiving households.
The income-giving profile among these 16,442 households displays the expected U-shaped characteristics (see Figure 1 ). For comparison, we also display the profiles for the two subdivisions of religious and nonreligious charitable giving. Households at the lowest income level (less than $10,000) on average give 4.55% of their after-tax income to charitable organizations. Those in the $10,000 to $19,999 category give 2.37% of income. Those making $20,000 to $29,999 give 2.14% of income. The declining trend continues until we reach those making $50,000 to $59,999 giving 1.36% of income. We later see an increase as those making $100,000 to $150,000 give 1.51% of income, and finally with those making more than $150,000 giving 2.17% of their after-tax income. Graphing these income-giving profiles reveals the distinctive U shape. More formally, a least squares regression of the quadratic, C i = α + β 1 X i + β 2 X 2 i + ε i where C i is each income increment's mean giving percentage, X i is each income increment's mean after-tax income, X 2 i is the square of the income increment's mean after-tax income, and ε i is the error term, confirms the U shape of our graph. β 1 is negative (-3.56E-07) and significant at the 1% level (p = .008); β 2 is positive (1.34E-12) and significant at the 1% level (p = .006), with R 2 = .59. The resulting curve is roughly U or reverse J shaped, with a minimum giving percentage at $132,282. Because the X 2 i term transforms the equation from a linear to a quadratic form, the significance of the β 2 term also equals the results from the F test comparing the quadratic against the linear equation form. Thus, the significance level of β 2 demonstrates the likelihood that the quadratic, in this case the posited U shape, better fits our data than a linear relationship.
As an alternative approach, we consider income percentiles, dividing all households in the sample into 100 income percentiles based on after-tax income levels. Our model then becomes,
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Percentage of Income Gifted (Non-Religious) Table 2 reports a similar pattern. β 1 is negative and significant at the .1% level (p < .0001); β 2 is positive and significant at the .1% level (p < .0001), with R 2 = .40 for the regression. This third approach generates another U-shaped or reverse-J curve, with a minimum point at the 67th income percentile in our sample.
We avoid using the reverse-J descriptor in favor of a U shape based on results from other surveys, such as the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), that specifically oversample very high income households. These demonstrate a rising percentage giving level at the very highest income levels, levels that are not strongly represented in our data set. On the same basis, we similarly avoid modeling the data as a power relationship with a rapidly then slowly diminishing income-segment gifting percentage, although such a model does generate a higher R 2 than the U-form quadratic in some of our permutations.
In sum, we see confirmation of the U-shaped income-giving profile, most strongly in the left side of the U associated with lower income levels, demonstrated in several approaches. The pattern can be ascertained by visual inspection of fixed income increments, by least squares regression of fixed income increments, by least squares regression of income percentiles using mean income levels and its square as our independent variables, and by least squares regression of income percentiles using the percentile ranking and its square as our independent variables. CHALLENGES TO THE U-SHAPED GIVING CURVE Schervish and Havens (1995a , 1998 ) have published a series of challenges to the existence of the U-shaped giving curve in similar income-giving profiles. They explain that "the relationship between household income and percentage of income contributed to charity is described by neither a reverse-J nor a U-shaped curve. Rather the relationship is essentially flat with, if anything a slight upturn as income rises" (Schervish & Havens, 1998, p. 421) . Although agreeing that the U shape appears if the analysis is restricted to donating households, the authors contend that it does not appear in an analysis of the general population (Schervish & Havens, 1995b) .
We begin with Schervish and Havens's (2001) article to uncover the source of the dissonance between their conclusion and the results of our present study. The results reported there are generated by an amalgamation of both the 1995 SCF and the 1996 General Social Survey (GSS) that is used to generate an income-giving profile. The published information does not describe the exact form of the amalgamation in such a way as to be precisely replicable, so we review the two data sets separately. The SCF omits contributions of less than $500, essentially counting them as $0. To understand the impact of this approach for low-income households, consider an individual working a fulltime job at minimum wage who gives to charity at 2.5 times the average national rate (estimated at 1.9% of personal income; AAFRC Trust For Philanthropy, 2005) . The SCF counts this individual as a nongiver. Conversely, a person making $275,000 who gives at less than one tenth of the national rate is counted as a donor. This survey methodology clearly makes the SCF a poor instrument when trying to make charitable giving estimates regarding lower income households. This is important because it is precisely this lower income portion of the U-shaped curve that is being challenged. The authors attempt to ameliorate this weakness in the SCF by commingling its results with those from the 1996 GSS.
The 1996 GSS includes a subsample of fewer than 1,500 individuals who were asked about their charitable giving. Actual income levels are not reported, but rather individuals select a predefined income increment level. To calculate giving averages as a percentage of household income, we estimate income levels using the midpoints of each GSS income increment converted to the increment levels used in the 2001 article. The accompanying table (Table 3) shows that the income-giving table for the 1996 GSS does follow the distinctive U-shaped curve, except at one increment. Before giving too much weight to this single nonconforming income increment, we note that these subsamples contain relatively few observations-roughly 6% of the size of the comparable income increment samples reported in our present study-and thus wider variation is not unexpected. Nevertheless, given that 6 of 7 income categories do follow the characteristic U shape, it is at first difficult to ascertain how the GSS data could be viewed as invalidating the U-shaped income-giving profile hypothesis.
How then, using these underlying data sets, do we get to a conclusion that challenges the U-shaped giving profile? The answer appears to lie in the introduction of a selection bias. In each of Schervish and Havens's (1995a , 1998 ) articles challenging the U-shaped income-giving profile, the authors introduce a selection process that omits all observations where survey information was provided by those not considered "heads" of households. The 1995 SCF explains, "The person referred to as the 'head' in this codebook is either the male in a mixed-sex couple or the older individual in a same-sex couple." Some legitimately disfavor this methodology of omitting all households where the data were provided by married women or other non-heads on purely a priori theoretical grounds (Presser, 1998) . More specific to the current analysis, we find that for the particular relationship under examination, this selection process dramatically alters the resulting abridged data sets, creating a systematic bias. Table 4 shows the impact of this selection process. Examining $10,000 income increments up to the maximum bounded increment from the 1996 GSS, we report the impact on the data from the SCF, from the GSS, and from both. This selection process changes average giving levels by as much as 50%. More importantly, the selection process masks the U-shaped profile found in preceding and subsequent research by dramatically reducing average giving levels of lower income segments and at the same time increasing average giving levels of middle-range income segments. We briefly postpone discussion regarding why this selection process creates such a strong bias until after examining the sources of the U-shaped giving profile. Nevertheless, it is clear from the descriptive statistics that excluding these households creates an appreciable change in the data.
In addition to the head of household selection issue, the Schervish and Havens (1995a) article suffers from an additional reporting concern. In each of the income increments, the authors use the increment midpoint as an estimator of average income. However, in the lowest category, under $7,000, rather than using a $3,500 midpoint to match the approach used in the other categories, the authors instead employ a $5,000 "midpoint" as an estimate. Clearly, the lowest income category is being subjected to a bias not used for the other categories. This curious increase in estimated income results in a cut to the lowest category's percentage of income given to charity by 30%. If we treat the lowest income category as the others and calculate using a $3,500 midpoint, a least squares regression confirms the resulting U-shaped curve.
Specifically, the quadratic form,
where C i is each income increment's estimated mean giving percentage, X i is each income increment's reported income, X 2 i is the square of the income increment's reported income, and ε i is the error term, generates a negative β 1 (-2.9E-07) significant at the 1% level (p = .009), a positive β 2 (2.86E-12) significant at the 1% level (p = .006), with R 2 = .28 for the regression. The resulting curve is U shaped with a minimum point at $51,245 of income. Analyzing the goodness of fit using an F test indicates that we can reject the linear model in favor of the U-shaped second-order polynomial, as the resulting F statistic is 9.051 (p = .006). In addition, the second order polynomial cannot be rejected in favor of the posited third-order polynomialadding the cube of estimated income-that was plotted in the 1995 article, as the comparison generates an F statistic of 0.002 (p = .964). Thus, we must conclude that even the head of household-screened data underlying the 1995 article actually support the hypothesis of a U-shaped income-giving profile.
THE LINEAR PARTICIPATION PROFILE
If, then, we can successfully support the presence of a U-shaped incomegiving profile in American philanthropy, should we take from this profile that only the poor and, to a lesser extent, the wealthy are generous, whereas everyone in between is stingy? The answer is no. The U-shaped graph suggests a deceptively simple relationship that, on further analysis, is more unusual than we might expect. Schervish and Havens (1995a) accurately point out the inappropriate characterization of this relationship in popular articles identifying low-income households as typically generous and the middle class or wealthy as typically stingy. We see a clear demonstration of the inappropriateness of such characterizations of typical generosity by examining the charitable participation rates in each income increment. The proportion of households engaging in charitable giving generally increases as the income increments rise (see Figure 2) . Households with more income are much more likely to be charitable givers, and households with less income are much less likely to be charitable givers.
THE COMMITTED FEW
But how then does this participation trend reconcile with our U-shaped income-giving profile? How can lower income households be less likely to make charitable gifts and still give a higher proportion of total income to charity? Rather than reflecting typical household behavior within a segment, the U shape results from a small segment of highly committed donors. Let us define a committed donor household as one that gives 10% or more of its after-tax income to charitable causes. In our sample, these committed donors represent only about 5% of all households. However, as Figure 3 reflects, if we remove these households from our sample, the U shape completely disappears from the income-giving profile for the remaining 95% of households.
The source of our U shape, then, is not the behavior of 95% of households but the substantial impact of the committed 5%. It is the unequal distribution of these highly committed donors that produces our U-shaped profile.
As Table 5 reflects, although lower income households are less likely to participate in charitable giving, they are nevertheless more likely to be committed donors-giving 10% or more of after-tax income. The participation and commitment trends operate in an almost precisely contrary fashion. Yet even given the fact that lower income households are less likely to be charitable donors, they are still more likely to be committed charitable donors. Figure 4 shows how the proportion of households classified as committed donors drops as income rises over a wide range of income segments.
Our results reinforce and extend Auten et al. (2000) , who find that when only the top 5% of itemizing charitable givers are examined in each income category, a very strong U-shaped profile appears, with the highest percentages of income being given at the low and high ends. The present study adds strength to Auten et al., whose results were based exclusively on itemizing $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 1 9 , 9 9 9 $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 2 9 , 9 9 9 $ 3 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 3 9 , 9 9 9 $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 4 9 , 9 9 9 $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 5 9 , 9 9 9 $ 6 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 6 9 , 9 9 9 $ 7 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 7 9 , 9 9 9 $ 8 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 8 9 , 9 9 9 $ 9 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 9 9 , 9 9 9 $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 1 4 9 , 9 9 9 $ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 + taxpayers. As fewer than 10% of taxpayers in the bottom two income quintiles are itemizers, we might expect that selection bias would cause relatively high-proportion donors to be overrepresented in this lower income group (e.g., a low-income individual giving only 2% of income would not have reason to itemize-and hence would be excluded from the sample-whereas a high-income individual giving 2% would have reason to itemize). This standard deduction-based selection could, by itself, explain the lower income results obtained in Auten et al. However, such a selection argument does not apply to the CE data used here. The dramatic influence of a small, committed core of charitable givers is consistent with the "small world" hypothesis indicating that a large portion 0.0% 0.5% u n d e r $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 1 9 , 9 9 9 $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 2 9 , 9 9 9 $ 3 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 3 9 , 9 9 9 $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 4 9 , 9 9 9 $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 5 9 , 9 9 9 $ 6 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 6 9 , 9 9 9 $ 7 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 7 9 , 9 9 9 $ 8 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 8 9 , 9 9 9 $ 9 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 9 9 , 9 9 9 $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 1 4 9 , 9 9 9 $ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 + All Households Excluding Highly Committed Households (Giving 10+% of Income) of prosocial behaviors are located within a small proportion of the population (Kochen, 1989) . Reed and Selbee (2001) note a similar committed core in that 9% of Canadian adults account for 80% of volunteering, whereas 18% of the population are responsible for 80% of all charitable gifts. Given the importance of a small, committed donor household segment in our sample, it is useful to consider the factors that are associated with such a high level of charitable participation. Most commonly, the presence of the lower-income, highly charitable households that drive the left side of our U-shaped profile has been explained as the result of conservative religious sect affiliation by the poor. Although the "sect effect" is clearly a factor-lower income individuals are $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 1 9 , 9 9 9 $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 2 9 , 9 9 9 $ 3 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 3 9 , 9 9 9 $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 4 9 , 9 9 9 $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 5 9 , 9 9 9 $ 6 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 6 9 , 9 9 9 $ 7 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 7 9 , 9 9 9 $ 8 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 8 9 , 9 9 9 $ 9 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 9 9 , 9 9 9 $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 -$ 1 4 9 , 9 9 9 $ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 + Proportion of All Households Giving 10+% to Charity Proportion of Donor Households Giving 10+% to Charity more likely to be sect members, and sect members are more likely to give a high proportion of their income to their church (Iannaccone, 1988 )-we find an additional, powerful factor at work here. Our lower-income committed (those giving 10% or more of after-tax income to charity) donor households are in fact much wealthier than other households in their same income segments. (We here use liquid assets, defined as savings accounts, checking accounts, and marketable securities, as a proxy for wealth.) This wealth disparity is true for committed donors across the income spectrum. Committed donors in our sample are generally 2 to 3 times wealthier than other households in their income segment. But within the lowest income segments, this disparity widens. Committed donors in the lower income segments hold 4 to 17 times more liquid wealth than other households within their same income group. The seemingly extraordinary commitment of low-income households giving 10% or more of their income to charitable causes becomes somewhat less compelling after accounting for this dramatic wealth difference.
Percentage of Households Making Charitable Gifts
It appears that the prevalence of these low-income, high-asset committed donor households may be explained in part by the influence of retired households. Retired households living off of accumulated assets would be much more likely to have lower income and higher assets than comparable working households. In fact, highly committed retirement-aged households in our sample on average hold about 2.7 times more liquid assets than highly committed, non-retirement-aged households within the same income segment. Clearly, retirement-aged households are an important segment of the committed donor subsample. In fact, those aged 65 and older are found in 43% of committed donor households but in only 23% of other households. Most interestingly for our examination of low-income committed donors, we find that retirement-aged households are more prevalent in the lower income ranks of committed donors than in the higher-income committed donor segments. For example, retirement-aged households (those containing members aged 65 and older) constitute 48% of all committed donors earning less than $30,000 in our sample but only 15% of committed donors earning $80,000 or more. Thus, it appears that the strong presence of retirees with lower income and higher assets is a substantial factor in explaining the existence of our U-shaped income-giving profile. Savoie and Havens (1998) find similar characteristics of low-income, high-giving donors in the 1995 SCF, where such donors are more likely to be older, wealthier, married, and retired. The sect-affiliation explanation remains a viable component of this low-income, high-giving phenomenon, but it appears that we should supplement this standard explanation with the undeniable impact of lowincome, high-asset retired households.
A second distinction of the highly committed donor group may help to enlighten our understanding of the selection bias consequence in the previously referenced research. Although highly committed households are only
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slightly more likely to be married than other households (58% vs. 53%), this ratio appears to vary systematically with the income increment under examination. Table 6 shows how, at the lowest income level, more than twice as many committed-donor households are married as compared to other households, whereas at the highest income level, the proportion of committeddonor households that are married is slightly less than other households. This trend directly relates to the selection bias issue because eliminating observations provided by non-heads of households disproportionately affects married households. (A single-person household or single-parentwith-minor-children household cannot be eliminated in this selection process.) The argument can be made that randomly eliminating married households is acceptable because the same process is applied to all income increments. Unfortunately, the proportion of committed households that are married as compared to the proportion of noncommitted households that are married varies systematically with each income increment. Thus, in the lowest income segment, randomly removing married households will eliminate highly committed households at a rate 2.2 times greater than noncommitted households. But at higher income levels, the identical process will eliminate households from both committed and noncommitted segments at about the same rate. This reality helps to provide a partial explanation for the dramatic biasing effects of the selection process used in the previous research challenging the U-shaped income-giving profile. For example, we find an even stronger biasing trend in the previously mentioned SCF data. In that data set, randomly removing married households will eliminate highly committed households at a rate 3.8 times faster than other households in the lowest income segment but will eliminate highly committed households at a lower rate than other households in the $60,000 to $100,000 income range.
LIMITATIONS OF THE DATA
The CE collects information on household income and expenditures through quarterly interviews. Households participate for 5 consecutive quarters. The charitable giving information is requested in the 5th quarter. Thus, the typical household in our data set has participated in the survey for 15 months. The U.S. government uses the CE as the basis for the Consumer Price Index-the most widely used measure of inflation. The CE uses a "national probability sample of households designed to represent the total noninstitutional civilian population" (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2005, p. 7). The design of the CE, both in collecting data through quarterly inperson interviews and in selecting a nationally representative sample, can lead to concerns over reported charitable giving levels and reported income levels.
Concerns in reported charitable giving levels stem in part from the lack of oversampling of very wealthy households. A significant proportion of total Other data sources, such as the tax returns of itemizing taxpayers (on which the Giving USA estimates are largely based), are superior instruments for this goal. With the absence of strong information from the very wealthy, CE aggregate giving levels will not project to the full national totals. We rely on the CE in this case largely because the households that are of most interest are those in the lower and moderate income levels. Itemized tax return data, for example, are of little use in examining these households, as more than 90% of taxpayers in the first two income quintiles choose the standard deduction (Congressional Budget Office, 2002) . In addition, the data collection methodology may lead to underreporting of income. Although the households in this study have been questioned about 18 different categories of income for 5 consecutive quarters, some household members may remain hesitant to fully disclose income. Our limitation to complete income reporters eliminates those households unwilling to make any income disclosures but does not eliminate those choosing to make partially accurate disclosures. One alternative approach is to measure household expenditures, rather than income. For lower-income, higher-asset, retirement-aged households, we would expect this measurement to return very different results. Expenditures should exceed income for these households, reflecting the normal process of asset consumption in retirement. As we posit these households to be a major driver of the income-giving profile shape, this alternative measure would give different results. In fact, using household expenditures instead of income with the present data still produces U-shaped coefficients in the quadratic but dramatically increases the relative size of the standard errors.
2
Although the income data-collection process for the CE is subject to various failings from the veracity and memory of reporting households, it appears to be a stronger methodology than that used in some other studies containing nontruncated charitable data from representative low-and moderate-income households. Income levels in the Giving and Volunteering in the United States surveys used in Havens's (1995a, 1998) articles came from one question asked one time over the phone (Hodgkinson & Weitzman, 1990, p. 284 ). Respondents did not provide dollar amounts but rather selected an income increment category. The 1996 GSS used in Schervish and Havens's (2001) article contained one question regarding household income and one question regarding respondent income (Davis, Smith, & Marsden, 2005) . Again, respondents did not provide dollar amounts but rather selected an income increment category. For all of its faults, the CE remains as "the only U.S. government survey that relates expenditures of consumers in the United States to demographic characteristics" (Paulin & Ferraro, 1994, p. 23) . Therefore, it continues to be a useful source of information.
CONCLUSION
The U-shaped income-giving profile, where the average percentage of household income given to charity is higher in the lowest and the highest income segments, is a valid description of charitable behavior as reflected in an analysis of this national data set of 16,442 households. The U shape is confirmed by visual inspection and by least squares regression of a quadratic model for both common income segments and whole sample income percentiles. Previous findings contradicting the U-shaped profile are shown to suffer from selection bias that systematically deflates lower-income giving levels. Although the U-shaped income-giving profile is a valid description, it does not reflect typical household behavior within these income segments. Rather, the U shape is driven by the highly committed 5% of households that give at least 10% of their household after-tax income to charitable causes. These committed few include a high percentage of retirement-aged individuals, and as a group, the committed few are dramatically wealthier than other households within the same income segments. In addition to the traditional "sect effect" explanation for low-income donors who give a high percentage of income, it is important to recognize a wealth effect as a major contributing factor in this behavior. Notes 1. A similar effect from the selection process exists in the 1989 Survey of Consumer Finances data used in Schervish and Havens's (1998) article, where the lowest income category's average gifts are reduced, whereas midrange income levels are increased by as much as 34%.
2. Using expenditure percentiles as observation points, and increment ratios of charitable giving to expenditures as the dependent variable in an ordinary least squares regression produces an intercept of 0.07869 (0.00424), an expenditure coefficient of -6.07054E-7 (5.412171E-7), and an expenditure squared coefficient of 2.01969E-11 (1.114E-11). Replacing the original 12 income levels with identical expenditure levels and using the ratio of charitable giving to expenditures as the dependent variable produces an intercept of 0.01902 (0.00163), an expenditure coefficient of -2.29197E-8 (3.769127E-8), and an expenditure squared coefficient of 3.15115E-13 (1.57295E-13).
